Premature Speculation

Block is premature in arguing that the allegedly relevant empirical data shows that phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive accessibility (481). Although they state that they agree with Block’s point, Koch and Tsuchiya undermine a key portion of Block’s chosen empirical data (509). Koch and Tsuchiya cite Block’s utilization of fMRI data, particularly data on the fusiform face area, which is alleged to demonstrate phenomenal consciousness without cognitive access (510). Koch and Tsuchiya object to this evidence on the grounds that “vigorous” fMRI signals are not enough to account for consciousness. As they note, the relationship among the signals measured by fMRI is “very complex” (510). At most, activity in the fusiform face area is correlated with conscious face recognition. Moreover, even Block notes that, “Mere correlation is too weak” and that, “At a minimum, one wants the neural underpinnings of a match of content between the mental and neural state” (483).

Perhaps, it can be argued, Block’s point remains potent even if the fMRI data on the fusiform face area is speculative at best. Unfortunately for Block, if data such as the aforementioned are undermined, then so is his overall case. Block is counting on the empirical data to support his distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness. It is far too early in the neuroscience game to make such strong claims as Block’s that phenomenal consciousness overflows cognitive access. As Koch and Tsuchiya’s criticism of the fusiform face area fMRI data demonstrate, Block’s utilization of his chosen empirical data overextends said data’s power of explanation. When, or if, a mature neuroscience of consciousness comes to fruition, that is, one that does not merely correlate phenomenology with brute neural activity but posits clear and evidenced explanations, then such hypotheses as overflowing phenomenal consciousness can compellingly be tested. Until then, Block is exploiting data that is correlative at best or just plain wrong at worst.